The article proposes that the framework of media imperialism is appropriate for the study of US dominance of information and communication technology (ICT) industries in the period 1975-2000. Early media imperialism theories focused on US television exports at a time when such exports were set to decline in many local markets. Covert influences such as ownership, business models, professional values, content formatting, audience preferences, cultural hybrids and technologies, were insufficiently considered. In particular, the earlier focus on television and content may have distracted attention from the emergence of microprocessor-based computer networking technologies, their significance for the development of ICT industries, and the profound influence these have exerted on US economic and foreign policies. This article documents the continuing dominance of US corporate power, of US-based transnational corporations (TNCs) and, among them, of ICT industries, within the global economy. It charts US dominance of most spheres of computing and telecommunications at the turn of the 21st century. With specific reference to intelligence estimates of future global trends it assesses the significance of the 'Asian challenge', specifically the challenge of Asian ICT activity to the prospects of a continuation of US hegemony.
Introduction
Media imperialism theories, during the decades 1960-80, focused mainly on US television, yet audiences for US exports were set to decline, relative to local productions. More significant, arguably, was the emergence of microprocessor-based computer network technology. While concepts such as the 'information age' and related issues have attracted critical analysis, attention to US interests served by global computer networking between 1970 and 2000 is less common.
Media imperialism theories focused on inter-nation flows. Scholars considered whether imbalances resulted from market advantage (e.g. Tunstall, 1977) , differential government sponsorship (e.g. Mattelart, 1979; Schiller, 1969) , hegemonic expression within complex cultural formations (e.g. Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1991) , or whether they primed resistance. Boyd-Barrett (1982) argued that extra-national media influences impacted on different media differently at different times. Many scholars focused on 'global media' -i.e. predominantly national media that had achieved significant penetration of world markets (e.g. BoydBarrett, 1980 , on news agencies).
Content was rarely contextualized with reference to covert influences, including ownership, business models, professional values, content formatting, audience preferences and technologies (cf. BoydBarrett, 1977; Lee, 1980) . Critiques mainly concentrated on television content, variously arguing that: nations were inappropriate units of cultural analysis; media imperialism was temporary; media-centric models took insufficient account of non-media influences; media products were 'read' in diverse ways; and localism and hybridization of media content was increasing (e.g. Straubhaar, 2004) .
These substantial objections were debatable. 'National' cultures, as representations 'constructed' by state agencies, social elites and media, are certainly vulnerable to internal and external cultural competition the less open they are to cultural diversity within 'national' borders. Yet they remain significant in assessments of the autonomy of sovereign states under globalization. Media imperialism need neither be permanent nor all-encompassing to be worth studying. 'Reading' diversity stretches the significance of cultural products beyond the indications deducible from content analysis, but offers little insight into processes determining which cultural significations are magnified for mass dissemination, and which are lost. Localism and cultural hybridity, finally, foreground representations of local identity that may obscure penetration of local structures by corporate and regulatory agencies, models and values of the global economy.
Technology variables were foregrounded by Innis (1950) , McLuhan (1964) and Postman (1994) as epoch-defining features. Their works lacked influence in political economy or cultural studies traditions, which preferred political, economic and ideological over technological sources of determination or were resistant to determinism -as in critiques of 'information age' discourses (cf. Webster, 1995) . Just as Pool (1983) turned belated attention to the telephone, a similar need may attend information and communication technologies (ICTs) . (While this term includes traditional media, my focus is on computing and telecommunications.) Study of ICT uses, contents, and contexts in media research is in relative infancy with much scope, as Mansell (2004) has noted, for political economy analysis (Schiller, 1999) , given: an ICT-constituted infrastructural bedrock of mediated communication; significant cross-investment between ICTs and 'traditional' media; convergence-driven enhancement of digitization, conglomeration, concentration and commercialization. Profound policy issues are raised by ICTs, for example, the regulation of broadband gate-keeping by (converging) telephony and cable operators, internet service providers and search engines. They are critical for the agents and operations of a global economy. For over 25 years ICTs were dominated by the USA, which was the largest economy in 2005, and the principal driver of globalization.
ICT: superpower response to threat
US dominance of ICT relates to a dialectical interplay of continuing macro-structural communication trends. Building on Hamelink (1994) I identified these as follows (Boyd-Barrett, 2004b ):
• 'Americanization' (adaptation of American business and content models); • commercialization, impacting both market-driven and public sphere media;
• 'competitivization' -a cycle in which market opportunities are created by regulatory change or technological innovation, generating spurts of intense competition succeeded by consolidation;
• concentration of ownership within media markets; • conglomeration of media industries across media and non-media industries;
• convergence of previously distinct delivery technologies; • democratization -temporary media proliferation accompanying transition from one-party dictatorship to corporate controlled democracies;
• deregulation, from 'public interest' to pro-'competition' paradigms; • digitization; • market specialization in response to niche advertising opportunities; • fusion of common carrier and gatekeeper regulatory paradigms; • internationalization of markets; • privatization of previously government-owned media.
Various factors threatened US hegemony in the 1970s: stalemate with the USSR following the 1960s' Cuban crisis; defeat in Vietnam; recession-inducing OPEC price increases; antagonism to US support for despots and covert usurpations of democracies in support of US business Boyd-Barrett Cyberspace, globalization and empire 2 3
and/or strategic interest; and backlash from covert interventions, including the Iranian revolution. It was vulnerable ideologically, in the UN, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and elsewhere. Frustrated emergent nations aspired to an elusive sovereignty. Leveraging numerical strength in the UN, many demanded a 'new international economic order' (NIEO), of import substitution, nationalization of TNCs and cartelization of Third World suppliers (Ryan, 1998) . Parallel demands for a new world information and communication order (NWICO) (cf. BoydBarrett, 2001 ) sought redress of one-way, unregulated, biased flows of information by means of free and balanced exchanges among sovereign nations. These demands were savaged by US President Reagan's 'new world order' (NWO). New world order was about market re-regulation, best represented by the enforced break-up of AT&T in 1984. This energized telecommunications capital, in partnership with TNCs, for expansion and retooling of global communications infrastructure. The USA left UNESCO, seeing it as the sponsor of NIEO and NWICO ideologies of little benefit to global capitalism. Import substitution was difficult, anyway, for impoverished nations faced by First World competitors (Ryan, 1998) . Western interests, representing nationalization of TNCs as a demonstrably inefficient, corrupt and overweening exercise of state power, aggressively undermined such strategies. Third World resources were exhausted, in any case, by debt repayments, often foisted on corruptible Third World leaders by Western 'economic hit men' (Perkins, 2005) in return for lucrative contracts. OPEC-style alliances posed little threat to the West when applied to easily substitutable non-oil products.
The USA increasingly pursued national interest through submissive agencies, notably the World Bank, IMF and G7, where NWO policies promoted free trade, capital and information flows, that gave free reign to the global expansion of Western corporations, supported by a US defence-incubated 'secret weapon' -networked microprocessor technologies. New World Order envisioned a digital plenty unburdened by older regulatory premises of scarcity, universal service, and separation of carrier from provider. It dismantled trade barriers, strengthened TNCs, and heralded an economic boom whose physical and ideological success helped undermine the regimes of Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia and pushed China towards party-controlled capitalism.
Microprocessor, computer and networking technologies, developed by US defence and other federal agencies, partnering with electronics corporations and universities, developed to a point where deregulation of AT&T's telephony and equipment monopoly had dramatic (Ideafinder, 2005) , the basis for hand-held calculators. The first desktop-size computer was launched in 1974; personal computers were sold by Tandy, in 1977, when Apple II computers appeared. The IBM PC arrived in 1981, its operating system available to other computer makers, creating an industry standard.
PC inter-communication via modem with dial-up services boosted innovation, especially with Apple Macintosh's user-friendly interface from 1984. Networks and networking expanded exponentially. The domain name system appeared in 1983. In 1989 Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom were among the first to join the internet, with 100 countries connected by 1991. Commercial e-mail relays, the world wide web and search tools appeared at this time. Restrictions on commercial use were lifted.
Were US-dominated ICTs beneficial for the USA? Firebaugh (2004: 33) argues that IT contributed little to the growth of overall world output, whereas industrialization spurred rapid growth in the world's poorer regions. While ICTs buttressed US hegemony, the massive switch to an information economy occurred at the expense of manufacturing (representing only 13 per cent of US GDP in 2005) and provided a surplus for China, India and others with which to challenge the US ICT lead and longer-term US hegemony.
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Core features of millennium globalization I have charted elsewhere US global economic supremacy, its relative decline, and the relevance of ICT (Boyd-Barrett, 2004a , 2004b . Here I attempt a brief summary. In 2000, in a $33 trillion global economy, the USA was twice the size of Europe (Kahn and Andrews, 2001 ). The USA, Europe and Japan accounted for more than 50 per cent of global economic activity. Of the FT Global 500 top corporations (ranked by market capitalization) in December 2003, 254 (51%) were US. Five countries (US, Japan, the UK, Germany and Canada) accounted for 76 per cent in 2003. Leading economies were originating hosts to and, in the short term, principal beneficiaries of, TNCs. The world's 60,000 TNCs in 1999 controlled 500,000 foreign affiliates, accounting for 66 per cent of global exports, and more than 65 per cent of output in originating host countries. United States' TNCs received huge inducements from originating hosts. The 1971 US Foreign Sales Corporation Program and its 2000 successor encouraged US firms to ship overseas profits to offshore tax havens. In 2004 the WTO deemed this programme, worth $50 billion to business, a violation of free trade, whereupon the programme was replaced by tax concessions including an 85 per cent tax reduction in foreign profits of overseas subsidiaries.
Knowledge-based industries, strongly represented among TNCs, were integral to US dominance. Broadly defined, they accounted for half of OECD output in 1995. More than 11 per cent of top global 1000 companies by market value (Business Week, 1998) were ICTs, accounting for 67 per cent of the top 100 and 50 per cent of the top 10 (BoydBarrett, 2004b). Of the FT Global 500 in 2000, 20 per cent were ICTs. In the FT 500 industries' listing in December 2003, telecommunications ranked fourth (US corporations accounting for 32% of capital value), IT hardware fifth (US corporations accounting for 82%), and IT software and computer services seventh (US corporations accounting for 92%).
A National Intelligence Commission report (NIC, 2000) predicted intensification of globalization to 2015, its major driver being the USA. The USA's IT-based precision-guided weaponry would sustain its military dominance for 15 years, bolstered by economic power, strong universities and R&D investment (accounting for 50% of all 'advanced' countries' R&D expenditure). The NIC (2000) had predicted that ICT and military leads would attract adversaries (confirmed by 9/11 lowtechnology attacks). All NIC scenarios anticipated a waning of US power. Growing population and the economy would require a 61 per cent
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Global Media and Communication 2(1) increase in US energy imports, and corresponding political and military activity to pressurize foreign governments to open energy sectors to US investment. While 'relatively' certain that the USA would remain the 'single most powerful actor economically, technologically, militarily' up to 2020, the NIC (2004) expected an erosion of US power, including its science and technology edge (NIC, 2004: 8-17) , in favour of Asia. United States' 'global primacy ', Sigal (2004) has argued, rested on 'its ability to develop new technologies and industries faster'. Primacy was threatened by negative impacts of globalization generally, and by Asian ICT competition specifically. Globalization had reduced the relative power of the USA (see Du Boff, 2003) . In 1950 it had contributed half of global GDP but only 21 per cent in 1999. Its role as a global reserve currency was threatened by US dollar erosion (Roberts, 2005) . (Giles, 2005) , offering limited opportunities for responsive export growth (Schiff, quoted by Ackman, 2005) . The UN (Becker, 2005) urged major industrial countries to help the USA reduce its deficits by boosting their own economies.
The dynamic combination of huge debt, large deficits and a weak dollar may trigger a transition to euro pricing by OPEC countries. Economic precariousness may foster aggressive foreign policies, including military bids to control oil reserves and discourage producers from euro-denominated trade. National Intelligence Council (NIC, 2004) expectations for a multi-polar world, acknowledging the strengths of the EU, China, India, Brazil and Indonesia, challenged neoconservative aspirations to permanent supremacy, revealing deep divisions among US elites.
Globalization and the communications media
Defining characteristics of millennium globalization (Boyd-Barrett, 1999) include the inclusivity of the global economic order. The NIC found 'about two-thirds of the world's population live in countries . . . connected to the global economy ' (2004: 29) . Secondly, globalization is currently driven by Western TNCs that outsmart national and global Boyd-Barrett Cyberspace, globalization and empire 2 7 regulatory agencies. Thirdly, globalization is dependent on, and a promoter of, ICT. ICTs sustain globalization; they create profit from hardware, software and services, protected by patent and intellectual property rights (IPR) legislation of primary benefit to developed economies. Intellectual property rights regimes are obligatory for accession to WTO membership or IMF/World Bank funding. Communications products and services are vehicles for advertising -critical to trans-nationalization of sales through paid-for advertisements and representations of products, services and lifestyles. Global trade and finance are facilitated by ICT infrastructures. Basic and enhanced telecommunications sustain economic development of states and enterprises. Content providers (Reuters, Bloomberg, etc.) lubricate trade and finance, sometimes structuring forums of exchange. Communications industries contribute to global 'semiotic constructions', through images of the world, nations, institutions, people and activities, that media create and distribute, or not. Images signify meanings, values that shape how globalization processes are perceived, accepted or contested. While 'effects' cannot be assumed, representations are significant when they privilege some voices, values and interests, and exclude or marginalize others (BoydBarrett, 1998).
Cyber leader
The US was undisputed global ICT leader in 2000, reflecting R&D sustained over several decades -$290 billion in 2004, over twice Japan's total:
For the last five decades, U.S. scientific innovation and technological entrepreneurship have ensured the country's economic prosperity and military power. It was Americans who invented and commercialized the semiconductor, the personal computer, and the Internet; other countries merely followed the U.S. lead . . . The United States also leads the major technology markets, holding commanding market shares in aerospace, scientific instruments, computers and office machinery, and communications instruments. U.S. information and communications technology producers lead almost every sector. And for the last two decades, U.S. firms have been the top providers of high-technology services, accounting for about one-third of the world's total. (Sigal, 2004: 2) In 2003, Microsoft was listed second on the FT Global 500 (46, Fortune 500), with $32 billion sales ($37 billion in 2004), $9 billion net and 55,000 employees. It monopolized global PC operating systems. Major (Curtin, 2006) . Open access Linux operating software actually supported software development of US giants IBM and Oracle. While free, it required additional technical and personnel resources for the generation and maintenance of unique software solutions.
The US dominated the $46 billion global server market: IBM (38% share in 2004), Hewlett-Packard (26%) and Sun Microsystems (10.5%) (Forelle, 2004) . Using proprietary chips and operating systems in server computers for internet and e-business, Sun ranked 157 on the Global 500 (173, Fortune 500) in 2003 with $11.4 billion sales, a net loss of $3.4 billion and 36,100 employees. Dell, Hewlett-Packard and IBM controlled the low-end consumer server market. Global leader for data routers was (US) Cisco, ranking 20 on the Global 500 (100, Fortune 500) in 2003, with $18.9 billion sales, $3.6 billion net, and 34,000 employees. Communications conglomerates embedded in the advertising-rich domestic US market accelerated global demand for advanced ICT. Time Warner, for example, was 31 on the FT Global 500 (27, Fortune 500) in 2003, with $38 billion sales, net of $2.6 billion and 80,000 employees. Through online and cable interests, it was the principal conduit of broadband services to residential clients (now challenged by US cable and telephony interests), serving more than 50 per cent of wired US homes and 16 overseas markets. Major US portals such as AOL and Yahoo! governed access to a web dominated by US English-language sites, many fed by such US news organizations as AP, CNN and MNBC. United States corporations pioneered and dominated digital rights management transaction services, internet market research, internet searching, cable modems, satellite and cable television set-top boxes, and fibre optics components.
The US telecommunications market, fractured by technology-led rivalries, was the world's wealthiest. Beleaguered AT&T was still the number one US long-distance provider in 2004, ranking 63 on the Global 500 (40, Fortune 500), with $34.5 billion sales, net of $1.9 billion (Latour and Drucker, 2005) , and by Verizon for MCI (worth $6.8 billion). Such mergers would terminate distinctions between long and local distance, fixed line and wireless telephony, voice, data, internet and television. These were among the largest global capital accumulations, likely to reduce competition and increase prices (Noguchi, 2005) . The top three US telecommunications providers in 2002 (WorldCom, Sprint and AT&T) commanded 80 per cent of the US residential market, providing internet backbone service, international long-distance with 50 countries, international private lines with 60 countries, and data and custom network services to large business customers (Associated Press, 27 June 2000). From 2005, the internet backbone would be controlled by Verizon (owner, MCI -previously WorldCom), SBC (owner, AT&T) and Sprint/Nextel.
Few non-US enterprises possessed an equivalent concentration of technologies, distribution networks and top market presence. Verizon in 2005 supplied 53 million US local phone lines serving 27 million homes and 2.4 million businesses with 17.7 million long-distance, 3.6 million DSL internet and 43.8 million wireless subscribers. The acquisition of MCI added offices in 65 countries, 130 data centres in 22 countries and 98,000 miles of line. SBC controlled 52 million US local phone customers plus 20.9 million long-distance and 5.1 million DSL customers. Its 60 per cent ownership of Cingular Wireless added 49 million wireless customers. Acquisition of AT&T added three million business clients, including most large corporations, 24 million residential customers and an international network reaching 50 countries, 850 cities and 26 advanced data centres (Granelli, 2005) .
In 2000, US Lucent Technologies was the global leader in telecommunications equipment. In 2004 it ranked 236 on the Global 500 (243 on Fortune 500) with $8.5 billion sales and 34,500 employees. Nokia (Finland) and Ericsson (Sweden) led in cell phone technology, despite growing US demand supporting US providers like Motorola. In 2004, Motorola ranked as the world's second largest mobile manu-facturer, after Nokia, ahead of Samsung (South Korea), with $27.l billion sales and 88,000 employees. It ranked 124 in the Global 500. Nokia, still number one in 2004, had $37 billion sales with 51,359 employees. It ranked 30 in the Global 500.
Asian backlash
Given NIC concern about the challenge to US hegemony from the emergent powerhouses of Asia, this section focuses on ICT activities in India and China -not the only 'threats'. Bleha (2005) Two frameworks assess the significance of US decline. One finds US economic hegemony was fragile by 2000, with Asian powers exerting countervailing political and economic muscle, sometimes directly in opposition to US interest. This implied unintended, negative consequences for US leadership of market liberalization policies -the prevailing characteristic of contemporary globalization. An alternative framework acknowledges relative declines in power, but welcomes a multi-polar world balancing tensions between world regions and subregions (e.g. India and China) through economic interdependency. Such a scenario antagonizes neoconservatives for whom hegemony is a central goal requiring integrated economic and military strategies. The rationale, if not the justice, of their perspective is underwritten by an energy crisis as world gasoline resources diminish, and international competition for energy supplies intensifies in the period separating 'peak oil' and availability of alternative, affordable energy sources (Goodstein, 2004; Heinberg, 2003; Roberts, 2004; Ruppert, 2004; Vaitheeswaran, 2003) . Other factors in this mix include environmental degradation, global warming and terrorism (state-backed and autonomous).
Supporters of the interdependency model can take comfort from strong corporate US intervention in Chinese and Indian ICT, suggesting substantial benefit for US investors in, and US corporate clients of, Chinese and Indian ICT services and supplies. Destabilizing factors, long term, include: US relations with either country; whether the USA is seen as predatory; and whether China or India, like the USA, leverage economic growth for military prowess.
India constituted 1.6 per cent of global IT services in 2001 (Bhattacharjee, 2004) , becoming increasingly attractive to TNCs as a By 2008 IT will be India's main foreign exchange source, with annual revenues of $50 billion ($25 billion from outsourcing), employing one million in call-centre, back-office and software jobs (Bhattacharjee, 2004) . Some outsourcing clients preferred US firms like IBM, EDS and Hewlett-Packard, operating in both USA and India. IBM acquired Daksh eServices Ltd in 2004, one of India's largest call-centre companies (revenues of $60 million in 2003-04), with more than 6,000 call-centre and customer-service workers for multinationals such as Amazon.com (Slater, 2003) . IBM already employed over 9,000 in India for development and back-office work. Other US corporations in India included Oracle (4,200 employees), PeopleSoft (400-1,000), HewlettPackard (8,000) and Cisco (600) (Richards and Margolis, 2004) , chasing 50 per cent savings on expenses, with salaries in India a tenth of those for equivalent jobs in the USA. Retaining locally earned profits in India, they avoided US tax. Domestic Indian demand, meanwhile, fed US profits (Einhorn, 2005) . Lenovo is China's fifth largest company, the world's third largest computer maker in terms of units, whose cheap labour eroded competitor PC profit margins. IBM retained a minority stake with three other US equity firms, claiming this development helped China 'by building the high-technology engine rooms to power modern corporations and government institutions with IBM services and software' (Lohr, 2004: C1) . Lacking Western-style revenue bases in advertising, China's top portals, SINA (developed by US-based Sinanet and Western investors), SOHU (whose Western backers included Intel and Dow Jones) and NetEase, earned proportionately more from paid messaging, charging state-owned cellular operators for news updates, games and online dating services, in a $3 billion market in 2004. Several factors impeded the growth of high-end computing: problematic IPR protection; piracy; and inflexible equity markets (Einhorn et al., 2002) . Nonetheless, Western TNCs established 400 research centres, between 2000 and 2004 (Buckley, 2004) . IBM research laboratories employed 150 Chinese scientists; IBM software development labs had 500 engineers working on Linux projects; Microsoft Research Asia, in Beijing, employed 170 scientists; General Electric planned 1,200 researchers. Oracle, Motorola, Nokia, Nortel, Siemens, Intel, all operated full-scale China labs for advanced products. Buckley (2004: C1) noted these would 'help China grow from mostly a user and copier of advanced technologies developed elsewhere into a powerful incubator of its own'. TNCs feared China would leverage market clout, setting local standards for key technologies and requiring foreign suppliers to conform. Chinese strengths include cheap labour; low cost, low technology production; and large volume markets for goods sold at low prices with low profit margins (easy to sell worldwide). Piracy has reduced US software earnings, contributing to the success of low cost Chinese competition. China partnered with the European Union to offset dependency on the US, working with France to develop Linux for PCs, servers and handheld computers. Unlike 1970s' Japan, which closed its domestic market to foreign investors, China strategically traded access to its internal market in exchange for foreign expertise, to better position itself globally. Sigal (2004) found Asian competition based on 'competitive tax policies, increased investment in R&D, and preferential policies for science and technology personnel', was reflected in increases in percentages of patents issued to Asian scientists, journal articles written by Asians, competitiveness in application services, computer chips and telecommunications software, and innovations in lasers, biotechnology, and advanced semiconductors and aerospace materials. United States' budget deficits, meanwhile, refocused R&D on defence weaponry, homeland security and space, reducing funding for basic research. Labour shortages in science and engineering exacerbated the imbalance.
TNCs' Asian partners developed local innovations, assisted by government funding, market-oriented approaches, and expansions into bio and nanotechnology. (Although half of all nanotechnology startups were US-based, government funding for nano companies was equally divided between Asia, Europe and North America, Baker and Aston, 2005 .) More than half a million US jobs were lost between 2000 and 2003 in high-tech industries characterized by large R&D investment-tosales ratios, and 632,000 jobs were lost in high-tech service industries in 2003 alone. Senator Lieberman worried that the USA was 'not just moving good jobs overseas, but . . . may be transporting big blocks of our innovation infrastructure, the talent and technology that fueled our record setting growth and prosperity in the 1990s' (US Senate, 2004) .
The NIC noted that:
technological advances outside of the United States could enable other countries to set the rules for design, standards, and implementation, and for molding privacy, information security, and intellectual property rights . . . countries like China and India will, because of the purchasing power of their huge markets, be able to shape the implementation of some technologies and step on the intellectual property rights of others. (2004: 35) It would become increasingly difficult to exercise 'oversight, control, and prohibition of sensitive technologies ' (2004: 35) . One illustration of an opposing trend in security terms is US-generated Promis-related software that gives users undetectable oversight over, even intervention in, hugely complex multi-platform networks (Kane, 2005) , relevant to the NIC's 2004 prediction that a growing range of actors 'may acquire and develop capabilities to conduct both physical and cyber attacks against nodes of the world's information infrastructure, including the internet, telecommunications networks, and computer systems that control critical industrial processes such as electricity grids, refineries, and flood control mechanisms ' (2004: 97) . The extent of the Asian challenge to the US is enhanced by factors internal to the US. Since 2001 US budgets have given priority to defence weaponry, homeland security and space. A failed doctrine of 'comparative advantage' now appears to have undermined US hegemony, increasing its dependency on other nations for goods and capital. The US has demonstrated a declining commitment to basic R&D, and has permitted shortages of science and engineering graduates, while numbers of foreign applicants for US graduate study have declined. The US has been slow to respond to the need for concerted integration of IT, biotechnology and nanotechnology. There has been a loss of manufacturing jobs, especially in high technology industries (2.9 million since 2000) and these have affected entire industrial clusters, with a consequent decline in entry-level IT work that in turn reduces the appeal of IT education. The US dropped from 1st to 5th place in the World Economic Some high-tech designed exports to TNC affiliates are not included by China as imports. China suffers from shortages of scientists in some areas (e.g. biology). It has been criticized for failing to build strong technology supply networks. There is considerable overcapacity. Expenditure on R&D by ODMs is low. Problems afflicting both China and India include the challenge of sustaining innovation at a distance from the main customer base. Outsourcing is problematic to many corporations that are disappointed with the results in terms of quality or money saved.
The US retains considerable strengths. The US manufacturing sector in 2004, though much maligned, equalled the entire Chinese economy in dollar terms. The US has enjoyed rising productivity, and manufacturing volume increased between 2001 and 2003; 60 per cent of productivity improvements coming from better software, computers and telecommunications links. US industry benefits from the cheaper prices of Chinese imports. Outsourcing is benefiting US corporations, saving up to 70 per cent of development costs, and allowing US engineers to concentrate on 'next generation' technology -assuming they can hold the line between 'mission-critical' R&D and 'commodity work'. Important Chinese advances, meanwhile, often build on US technology, for example, the Chinese VCD built on chips developed by US corporations C-Cube and Motorola. US corporations provide computer chip 'reference sets', nearly complete solutions, prior to Chinese assembly: development is then faster, with more scope for extra features, and cheaper.
Conclusion
Early media imperialism theories concentrated too specifically on US television exports, just at a time when the significance of such exports in many local markets was on the point of decline. Scholarship gave insufficient weight to other dimensions of imperialism, including business models, professional values, content formatting, audience preferences and technologies. Technology variables, notwithstanding the importance attributed to them by such scholars as Innis (1950) , MacLuhan (1964) and Postman (1994) , have had a relatively low profile in political economy and cultural studies, traditions that are highly sceptical of single variable determinism. This may help account for the relative neglect of attention to the political economy of microprocessorbased computer networking, specifically as this concerns US interests, the role of ICT industries in helping underwrite US superpower hegemony over several decades, and the contributions of Asian ICT competition to potential erosion of that hegemony.
